A problem of interest

How rates affect investment strategy in 2024



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Foreword from our Chief Investment Officer

Welcome to our 2024 Outlook, reflecting the main findings of our quarterly Strategic Forum. I am pleased to share our view on the global economy and investment markets for the year ahead.

While uncertainty is a hallmark of any outlook, the path ahead for 2024 may be even more murky than usual. There is a range of economic and market outcomes that remain feasible, ranging from a 'higher-for-longer' rate environment – as currently priced by markets – to even a potential return to a 'lower-for-longer' scenario. The latter seems very unlikely to us given today's very different dynamic from the 2010s environment of rapid globalisation and tight fiscal policy.

Ultimately, we don't think the decade ahead will look anything like the previous one. The impact of higher interest rates on risk premiums will push investors to re-think their strategic asset allocation accordingly. Looking more tactically, our 'house view' is for defensive positioning in portfolios at present. That reflects what we see as an optimistic scenario priced into markets versus our concerns over elevated risk of recession and further disinflation.

Higher interest rates and a rising cost of capital pose some challenges for stock markets and the most risky parts of credits, which could be victims of rising defaults and steeper credit curves. Nonetheless, we think bonds are back. High yield credit is now paying as much as historical equity returns. We prefer to focus on the belly of the curve – 1-7 years – and quality credit. We are also interested in owning duration now – the term premium is positive. That also supports the investment case for investment grade.

In general, we see good opportunities in global fixed income, but are selective. These would include the US Treasury curve, parts of core European bond markets – such as the UK and Germany – investment grade credits, and securitized credits. In emerging markets, we would also single out the 'higher quality' markets, such as India.

The Federal Reserve cutting rates can be very positive for emerging markets performance, such as in the early 1990s. With Fed cuts likely in the second half of 2024, and possibly to a greater extent than markets expect, emerging markets (equity or local debt) should be a key part of the investor consideration set.

Given the risks we have cautioned about, we emphasise that investors should look to mitigate through intelligent diversification that doesn't place excessive dependence on rates and stock correlation.

"In the shorter term,
the 'higher-for-longer'
interest rate narrative is
at risk of being challenged
by a combination of
ongoing disinflation
and recession."



Xavier Baraton
Chief Investment Officer



Macro outlook and market implications

The rapid tightening of monetary and credit conditions has created a problem of interest. This raises the risk of an adverse growth outcome in 2024 – which markets may not be fully prepared for.

Investment markets have behaved rather schizophrenically during the course of 2023, sometimes fearing a hard landing, and other times assuming a soft or no landing scenario would come about.

The surprising resilience in the US economy this year has come from the high level of excess savings – the piggy banks consumers built up during the pandemic years – which have continued to support spending.

Corporate profits have also been resilient, with firms able to benefit from mark-ups in a higher inflation environment, and from cash piles earning more interest. Those forces are becoming less important now so have delayed a recession, rather than averted one, in our view.

From an inflation standpoint, we see US disinflation proceeding in 2024, like in other western economies. Goods inflation has already fallen back quickly. Even though energy prices could be volatile, we expect that trend to continue. Meanwhile, central bankers are more focused on services inflation – and how 'sticky' that might be. However, after a rapid tightening of interest rates and financial conditions, we think the evidence is building that services inflation will continue to slow through 2024, as the housing and labour markets slow.

The inflation data will probably be bumpy, but the broad trend is for inflation to fall back towards central bank inflation targets over 2024.

Looking further ahead, we think there are a number of forces that will keep inflation higher over the medium term versus what we became used to in the 2010s.


Overall, we think we are heading towards a new paradigm, with inflation and interest rates somewhat higher than we were used to during the 2010s. This environment leads us to take a defensive approach in our investment strategy for next year.

Figure 1: Key themes in 2024



A Problem of Interest

Monetary and credit conditions have tightened materially. That breaks inflation, but risks breaking other parts of the system too.



New Paradigm

We are in a new economic regime of tighter money and more active fiscal policy. That means different macro dynamics, higher inflation and interest rates.



Defensive Growth

Market expectations are for a soft landing. But as the cycle slows and inflation falls, bonds are back. We focus on defensive strategies in portfolios.



Heading to a new paradigm

In our view, the new paradigm is likely to be one of interest rates around 3% and bond yields around 4%.

As we navigate the economic landscape over the next 12 to 18 months, investors will continue to grapple with what the new normal for the macroeconomy and investment markets will look like.

This is likely to result in volatile market action as the data flow is likely to be bumpy and provide mixed signals around the potential for a soft or hard landing in the economy. There will be scrutiny around corporate profits — a key driver of wider macro trends — and ongoing debate over the neutral rate of interest. Labour market and productivity trends will be key swing factors.


It is not impossible that we return to a regime of lowerfor-longer interest rates. But it is important to recognise the economic forces that took us to that point – rapid globalisation of the macro-economy, tight fiscal policy, and high levels of debt – have changed. For example: next year, in an important year of many general elections around the world, there are few politicians campaigning on a policy programme of 2010s-style fiscal austerity. We think there are three key drivers of the new paradigm:

- A new, multi-polar world (and a more fragmented global order) which results in the end of hyperglobalisation.
- More active fiscal policy driven by political priorities in an age of populism, environmental concerns and high levels of inequality. This contrasts with the austerity measures and monetary policy dominance of the past decade.
- Policies to address climate change and the transition to net zero.

In this backdrop, we would expect greater supply-side volatility and structurally higher inflation and interest rates – 2% as an inflation floor, policy rates around 3%, and bond yields at roughly 4%. Meanwhile, economic downturns are likely to be more frequent as higher inflation limits the ability of central banks to stimulate economies.

The assumptions considered in this new paradigm are crucial components in our long-term expected returns and capital market projections for next year.

Figure 2: New paradigm - Beyond the macro cycle, a different economic environment





Scenarios

Our baseline scenario embeds an elevated risk of economic slowdown and mid-single digit corporate profits growth. This is somewhat less optimistic than the outlook consistent with current market pricing.

Our inflation scenario means that we expect interest rate cuts in the second half of 2024. And we think the Fed could surprise the market by cutting rates more than currently anticipated – depending on labour market trends.

In the eurozone, inflation has surprised to the downside in recent months. The ECB usually lags the Fed in terms of policy turning points, but relatively poor economic performance could mean the pivot comes earlier.

In China, despite economic challenges emanating from depressed consumer confidence, a multi-year drag from the housing sector, and longer-run demographic headwinds, we expect policy support to deliver growth of around 4.5% in 2024. Nevertheless, we think more policy support is likely needed to sustain the recovery next year. Meanwhile, we expect the Bank of Japan will fully abandon their yield curve control policy and exit from negative interest rates by around mid-2024, as the economy breaks free from deflation.

Our central market scenario is consistent with a preference of bonds over equities in multi-asset portfolios, and a 'defensive growth' stance with a bias on quality and selectivity in stocks and credits. We also suggest 'intelligent diversification' strategies. This can include a systematic approach to thematic allocations, or exposure to emerging markets.

Our alternative risk scenarios are centred on the risk of higher interest rates, either because of renewed supply-side constraints, or strong productivity growth and limited corporate sector retrenchment. In the former scenario, we see markets performing poorly, while the latter is consistent with gains across many risk asset classes.

Figure 3: Central and alternative scenarios

Central scenario Alternative risk scenarios Problem of interest Economy establishes itself on 'the Persistent inflation problems. Macro West: Tight financial conditions induce GDP and profits recession even under weak economic golden path' aided by strong balance growth East: Lacklustre growth in China. Japan and India outperform Geopolitical shocks Productivity accelerates materially Minor rate cuts. The neutral interest West: Mid 2024 Fed/ECB rates cuts. QT on pause? Fiscal policy as mild drag Central bankers in a bind Policy rate is 4-5% Policy 'tighter for longer' East: China policy easing piecemeal, BoJ scraps YCC, Asia CBs easing in H2 Possible further hikes to anchor Growth enables 'mission-oriented' inflation expectations fiscal policy Stock markets retest lows Early stages of new stock market Market Bonds are back, but other liquid alternative diversifiers lose their shine in 2024 Real yields above 2% Emerging market assets falter Credit spreads tighten, few defaults. Defensive Growth favours selective approach in global and private credits, emerging market assets gain as globa Few winners - USD, momentum, equity factors, developed country selection, and emerging markets gold, macro hedge funds growth boosts Asia



Market implications

Current market pricing remains consistent with a soft-landing scenario, seemingly overlooking the elevated risk of recession. In this context, our 'house view' is for defensive positioning in investment portfolios at present and a view that 'bonds are back'.

A weaker economy and disinflation should be a supportive environment for government bonds and challenging for stocks. In general, we see good opportunities in parts of global fixed income – selectively. These would include the US Treasury curve, parts of core European bond markets such as the UK and Germany, investment grade credits, and securitised credits.

In our view, US equities are confronted with two major challenges necessitating a cautious view. First, earnings growth expectations for 2024 are over 3x nominal GDP—which is high for a late part of the cycle. Second, the market multiple now appears stretched relative to government bond markets.

In comparison, European stocks look cheaper on a global basis and hence downside could be limited – unless a bad recession materialises.

We expect that Japanese stocks could be an outperformer among developed markets given attractive valuations, the end of unconventional monetary policy and a high-pressure economy. There are also structural tailwinds of near-shoring, new investment in semiconductors, and corporate sector reforms.

For emerging markets, we think idiosyncratic trends warrant being selective based on corporate fundamentals, earnings visibility and risk-adjusted rewards. Although history might not repeat itself precisely, we know that a Fed rate cutting cycle can be very supportive for emerging markets' performance, just like it was in the early 1990s. Hence, the prospect of Fed cuts in the second half means that investors should keep emerging markets on their radar in 2024.

In such an environment, India bonds, Mexico bonds, and Chinese A-share stocks will be some of our top picks in emerging markets for 2024.

Figure 4: Views per asset class

Equities		Government bonds		Corporate bonds		Commodities, alternative	es and FX	Asian assets	
Asset Class	House view	Asset Class	House view	Asset Class	House view	Asset Class	House view	Asset Class	House view
Global	▼	Global	↔/▲	Global investment grade	↔/▲	Gold	A	Pan-Asia government bonds	A
US	▼	US	A	USD IG	↔/▲	Copper	▼	Asia ex-Japan equities	A
UK	▼	UK	A	EUR & GBP IG	A	Listed Real estate	A	China	A
Eurozone	▼	German 10yr	↔	Asia IG	↔/▲	Infrastructure		India	↔/▲
Japan	A	Euro Periphery	▼	Global high-yield	↔	Hedge funds	↔/▲	ASEAN	A
Emerging markets (EM)	↔/▲	Japan	▼	US high-yield	↔/▼	Private equity	↔	Hong Kong	↔/▲
Latam	↔	Inflation-linked	A	Europe high-yield	↔/▼	US dollar	▼	Asia FX	A
Frontier	A	EM (local currency)	A	Asia high-yield	↔/▲	Crypto	↔		
				Securitised credit	A		A	Positive ↔ Neutral ▼ N	Negative

Source: HSBC AM, November 2023. House view represents a >12-month investment view across major asset classes in our portfolios. Views reflect our long-term expected return forecasts, our portfolio optimisation process and actual portfolio positions. These views are for general information purposes only and does not constitute advice or a recommendation to buy or sell investments. Any views expressed were held at the time of preparation and are subject to change without notice. While any forecast, projection or target where provided is indicative only and not guaranteed in any way. HSBC Global Asset Management accepts no liability for any failure to meet such forecast, projection or target.





Do hedge funds still have an (h)edge?

Historically, hedge funds – including equity long/short, event-driven, macro, credit, and commodity trading advisors (CTAs) among others – have demonstrated their diversification abilities within broader asset allocations during market downturns or periods of stress.

More recently, and despite the unprecedented interest rate hiking series, the correlation between hedge funds and typical multi-asset allocations remains negative (Figure 1). Furthermore, hedge fund performance has been resilient over the period, with some strategies even benefiting from this shift in the macro-economic environment (Figure 2). For instance, credit-focused funds, have delivered higher returns of around 5.4% over 12 months compared to their three-years annualised returns of around 4.6%. This is primarily caused by rising interest rates and significant movements in bond markets creating a favourable environment in which creditfocused funds can operate.

In addition, when interest rates are elevated, many hedge fund positions can result in cash holdings, which would earn a higher rate of interest, therefore driving returns. Nevertheless, we also observe a significant amount of dispersion across hedge fund strategies.

Event driven funds, for instance, which often seek to profit from corporate actions such as mergers and acquisitions, suffered from the decrease in activity over the last two years amidst an environment that was not conducive to borrowing and dealmaking.

Similarly, macro strategies have underperformed the broad hedge fund universe over both one and three years. Across their broad history we can observe that there is a relatively wide dispersion of outcomes amongst each hedge fund style, in both bull and bear markets. This confirms that selectivity is a crucial component when implementing 'smart diversification' strategies in alternatives - and that a multi-style/multi-manager approach offers a reasonable option for investors.

Figure 1: Hedge fund correlation with 60/40 portfolio





Figure 2: Single manager hedge fund performance¹ (%)



Source: HSBC AM, Macrobond and Pregin data, September 2023.

The performance figures displayed relate to the past and should not be seen as an indication of future returns.

¹Hedge funds performance update: August 2023 (pregin.com).



What is the impact of a strong dollar and higher US rates on emerging markets?

Historically, the backdrop of falling dollar liquidity and weaker Chinese economic growth hasn't boded well for emerging markets, contributing to their lagging performance since the Fed began raising interest rates in March 2022.

However, the noteworthy narrative in 2023 shifts from overall weakness to varied performance within the emerging markets spectrum. Certain segments, such as India and Mexico, continue to perform very strongly. This highlights the importance of capturing these idiosyncratic trends and adopting an active management approach.

It's also important to bear in mind that investment markets will trade on future trends. We know that a Fed rate cutting cycle can be very supportive for emerging markets performance, just like it was in the early 1990s when Fed cuts encouraged a flow of capital into emerging markets (Figure 3).

While history may not repeat itself precisely, the possibility of faster than expected Fed cuts in H2 2024 suggests that investors should closely monitor emerging markets in the coming year – notably India and Mexico bonds, as well as Chinese A share stocks.

Figure 3: EM can perform after the last Fed hike



Source: HSBC AM, Macrobond data, November 2023. The performance figures displayed relate to the past and should

not be seen as an indication of future returns.

How do US stocks compare against bonds in the next 12 months?


While comparing US stocks and bonds, there are two sets of challenging dynamics for stocks.

- 1. Regarding earnings, there is an expectation of approximately 12% growth in 2024, equivalent to over 3 times the nominal GDP – a considerable figure in the later stages of the economic cycle.
- 2. The market multiple now appears stretched in comparison to government bond markets, whether considering real yields, which indicates a thin equity risk premium, or in relation to 30-year yields using a Fed model approach (Figure 4).

This situation arises concurrently with a rising term premium in US bonds, leading to what we term 'the tale of two risk premiums' - an increasing risk premium in bonds and a declining risk premium in stocks.

Given this scenario, a cautious stance on US stocks is warranted and we favour bonds as part of tactical allocations.

Figure 4: 'Fed Model' points to a valuation problem for stocks



Source: HSBC AM, Macrobond data, November 2023.

The performance figures displayed relate to the past and should not be seen as an indication of future returns.



What ESG issues are you watching?

We believe that next year we will see emphasis on implementation of industry frameworks with a focus on climate transition and sustainability disclosures, while exploring systemic risks such as preservation of natural capital, inclusive growth and responsible use of artificial intelligence.

For example, it is very likely that we will see the creation of local transition plan disclosure requirements across Asia and other jurisdictions, following issuance of new standards this year by the IFRS International Sustainability Standards Board, along with climate disclosure rules from the US SEC and the UK Transition Plan Taskforce. Greater consistency globally will be positive for holding companies accountable for their impacts wherever they operate.

Another development this year was strikes at a global oil major which rattled gas prices. We are likely to see more of this with an ongoing push for greater labour power and a 'just transition' that doesn't disadvantage certain geographies or segments of the population. Greater emphasis on inclusive growth will likely form a key part of discussion between companies and investors as a result.

Likewise, we expect investment in the climate transition from both private and public markets to continue its growth, with asset managers in position to support it. Although renewable energy companies have particularly suffered from higher interest rates over the past year, given their generally early stage and capital-intensive

business models, the demand and corresponding growth runway remains clear across a broad opportunity set.

While biodiversity and natural capital is interlinked with climate change, it is clear that the two are at distinctly different phases when it comes to implementation in the industry. Consensus however, continues to emerge and we expect to see companies with a material impact on nature having a greater uptake of the Taskforce for Nature-related Financial Disclosures framework, which launched in 2023

Another developing issue is trusted technology and data with tools such as artificial intelligence coming under scrutiny. We have already seen prominent technology companies having proposed shareholder resolutions on their responsible governance of artificial intelligence. This topic is likely to take hold in the 2024 proxy season and is something that companies are grappling with – both as an opportunity and as a risk.


What about adaptation efforts to address existing climate impacts?

Per this year's Adaptation Gap Report from the UN Environment Programme, progress on climate adaptation is slowing when it should be accelerating to catch up with rising climate change impacts. This slowdown translates to a constantly widening adaptation financing gap, which stands at an estimated \$194-366 billion per year.

Lack of adaptation steps and funding is adding to risk from climate change impacts. Beyond risks to life and property, this includes basic food and materials supply. This could be a contributor to inflationary pressures and a drag on economic growth in the years ahead.

There is an acute need for infrastructure investment, with the biggest opportunity sitting in Asia – accounting for nearly one-third of the estimated \$15 trillion global infrastructure gap. Investors and asset managers will have a role to play in achieving sustainable infrastructure development at scale.

Figure 5: Growth in types of climate strategies (Assets, USD billion)



Source: Morningstar Direct, Morningstar Research, as of June 2023





Refinancing the 'COVID Maturity Wall'

"Opportunistic funding at low rates during and just after the pandemic has created a 'maturity wall' in 2024-2026, which could create refinancing difficulties or force deleveraging.



Among the companies most vulnerable to the higher refinancing cost of short-term debt are those in capital sensitive sectors, lower quality banks, REITS and those in the lower parts of the high yield ratings spectrum.

The Asia maturity wall is steeper, but here is where issuers can most lean on local markets, especially in China and India where financing costs are lower and the market is deep.

Meanwhile, the latest economic expansion has been driven by income, rather than balance sheets, and therefore it is the earning outlook which will be key to how companies address upcoming maturities, which should be manageable in the event of the reasonably benign economic outcome currently discounted.

Greater utilisation of alternative sources of funding

will be part of the solution to the maturity wall for some issuers. This could actually provide technical support for credit markets in 2024, with sparse supply meeting increasing demand for higher yields.

As we can see in Figure 1, although the maturity wall is set to grow everywhere in 2024-25, the situation is not particularly acute in western developed markets, although there may be particular sectors which will feel stress.

Figure 1: A growing maturity wall

Sector	Market size (USD billion)	2024 Maturities	2025 Maturities	2024- 2025	Notes
US Investment Grade	8062	745	888	20%	Driven by Autos, Banks and post-Covid issuance from select sectors
Europe Investment Grade	3361	319	380	21%	Autos, Retail and Capital Goods
Asia Investment Grade	836	144	147	35%	China Financials and State Owned companies, Korean Financials and Coporates
US High Yield	1350	34	99	10%	BB-tilted but overall amount is elevated (2016-2022 average is around 5%)
US Leverage Loans	1340	22	107	10%	B3 and lower accounts for a high portion of refinancing needs
Asia High Yield	120	28	24	43%	China Property, Indian Corporates
Europe High Yield	403	48	61	26%	BB tilted

Source: HSBC AM, Bloomberg data, November 2023.



The US maturity wall is set to increase over the next 2 years and we believe that the vast majority of investment grade issuers are prepared to absorb higher financing costs. While refinancing is a growing risk in high yield, many issuers took advantage of improved financial conditions during 2023 to address near-term maturities.

The US Investment Grade maturity wall is set to increase by 21% year-on-year in 2024 (\$136 billion).

Approximately half of that increase is being driven by the banking sector due to increased regulations and Basel III. Within the non-financial sector, increased maturities are being driven by the outsized Covid-related issuance the market saw in 2020 and the following year.

The macro backdrop and market volatility will play a significant role in ultimate issuance in 2024, but refinancing risk should be manageable for most investment grade issuers. Pockets of vulnerability include regional banks, REITs, and select industrial issuers. In high yield, we expect default rates to continue to increase but feel the risks are fairly concentrated in select industries such as Media and Healthcare. In addition, the maturity wall is skewed towards higher quality BB issuers who should be more resilient to higher borrowing costs.

The pace and scope of market stress in 2024 and beyond will be driven more by the earnings backdrop versus changes in funding costs. Our base view is that US credit markets will likely benefit from a relatively strong technical picture next year, especially if a deep recession is avoided.

Figure 2: US investment grade maturities (USD billion)

Sector	2024	2025	% of '24-25 Maturity Wall	Variation 24/25
Banking	317	354	41%	12%
Consumer Non-Cyclical	74	93	10%	26%
Consumer Cyclical	70	94	10%	34%
Technology	52	64	7%	23%
Electric	35	39	5%	11%
Insurance	35	35	4%	0%
Capital Goods	34	42	5%	24%
Energy	30	45	5%	50%
Communications	24	37	4%	54%
Finance Companies	19	16	2%	-16%
Basic Industry	14	19	2%	36%
REITs	13	15	2%	15%
Transportation	12	15	2%	25%
Brokerage AM Exchanges	9	14	1%	56%
Financials	395	434	51%	10%
Non-financials	350	454	49%	30%
Total	745	888	-	19%

Source: HSBC AM, Bloomberg data, November 2023.

Figure 3: EUR investment grade maturities (USD billion)

Sector	2024	2025	% of total bonds	Variation 23/25	
Autos	26	24	37%	-29%	
Basic industry	15	19	26%	45%	
Capital Goods	16	20	29%	25%	
Consumer goods	21	23	24%	55%	
Energy	13	13	25%	17%	
Healthcare	15	18	20%	15%	
Media	3	4	20%	-5%	
Real Estate	12	20	19%	76 %	
Retail	9	8	28%	37%	
Services	6	3	31%	-4%	
Technology	5	10	25%	31%	
Telecoms	14	15	21%	4%	
Transportation	12	13	17%	10%	
Utilities	23	33	20%	70%	
Non-financial senior	200	228	23%	20%	
Non-financial hybrid	10	12	14%	34%	
Total non-financial	210	241	37%	54%	
Courses LICEC AM Places bear data Naviers bear 2022					

Source: HSBC AM, Bloomberg data, November 2023.

"We do not believe that there will be a widespread problem, but there are likely to be pockets of pressure which may pose risks to certain markets."



Maturity walls in European investment grade and high yield markets look manageable, but certain sectors in high yield such as automotive, chemicals, retail and real estate might experience more stress.

After record issuance in 2020 and 2021 driven by the low-rate environment and the ECB Corporate Sector Purchase Programme, supply was soft in 2022, recovered somewhat this year and we expect that to continue in 2024. Both investment grade and high yield companies have sound liquidity positions and committed credit lines, although some deterioration in credit metrics is expected from a position of strength – notably on coverage ratios. Besides, it would be important to watch the identified sectors such as Auto or Healthcare with maturities over 2024 and 2025 more than doubling.

European investment grade credit metrics are at peak quality with low leverage, elevated cash balances and margins at record levels – a strong starting point that should limit the volume of fallen angels next year.



High Yield credits have recovered post-Covid thanks to deleveraging and earnings growth, but weaker economies might weigh again on company fundamentals. While weakest credits remain in a fragile position in a rising rate environment, high-cash balances should sustain an increasing but moderate default rate. Particular stress is ongoing in REITs, where asset sales and search for alternative refinancing remain at the top of the agenda for most players.

Access to lower cost onshore debt is a key theme for USD Asian credits facing the most challenging maturity wall, which in an elevated US dollar rate environment is likely to lead to a further contraction in the size of the market in 2024.

High US interest rates and investor risk aversion to China high yield has made alternative sources of funding more attractive options for many issuers in the Asia USD bond market. In 2023 we have seen bonds in several sectors refinanced through bank loans, asset sales, internal cash as well as local bond issuance. Geographically, Korea has been an outlier with higher levels of issuance, driven by higher domestic funding costs than in USD when swapped back into KRW.

We see overall manageable refinancing risk for Asian investment grade sectors, where we would expect the China investment grade corporate complex to shrink further with the availability of relatively cheap onshore financing in a deep and liquid domestic bond market. Meanwhile, we expect financials activity to remain brisk, with Chinese and Korean banks and bank lessors likely to remain more active.

In Asia High Yield, we also expect China issuance to be tepid and for challenges to be confined mainly to individual companies where refinancing difficulties are well known

Figure 4: USD Asia investment grade maturities (USD billion)

Sector	2024	2025	% of 2025 maturity wall	Variation 24/25
China - Banking senior	24	27	18%	10%
China - SOE	17	18	12%	3%
China - Local gvt fin. vehicle	11	12	8%	11%
China - Bank leasing	8	5	3%	-45%
China - Property	5	2	1%	-59%
China - Asset management cies	5	6	4%	20%
China Industrials	2	2	1%	-10%
HK - Corporate and property	6	4	3%	-36%
Korea - Banks and financials	10	15	11%	51%
Korea - Private corporate	3	3	2%	-8%
Korea - Quasi	3	6	4%	97%
India - Banks & Financials	4	0	0%	0%
India - Corporates	2	1	1%	-53%
SEA - Banks	5	2	1%	-60%
Macau	0	2	1%	0%
AT1	0	1	1%	=
T2	10	6	4%	-37%
TMT	6	10	7%	59
Oil & gas	8	11	7%	30%
Sovereigns	11	10	7%	-13%
Other	3	6	4%	135%
Total	144	147		
Financials and sovereigns	78	71	48%	-8%
Non-financials	67	76	52%	14%


Source: HSBC AM, Bloomberg data, November 2023.



The rest of the emerging market debt market is showing a similar pattern. Albeit the issuance over 2023 is up by 55% compared to 2022 when the primary market was quite subdued, and net supply stayed negative.

All regions saw higher issuance, but ME&A was the most active region and we expect this scenario to repeat over 2024 with dominance of IG issuers. On the other hand, CEE will stay negative for the third year. LatAm issuance remains quite low reflecting the still challenging conditions in international markets (similar to Asia) as well as the significant liability management many issuers took in previous years. Although we expected it to pick up next year, the region should remain in net negative territory, which would be the seventh year in a row of negative net issuance.

Overall, with the net negative issuance for emerging markets, technical factors should be positive for the asset class in 2024, notwithstanding important idiosyncratic risks.






The value anomaly in European equity markets

"Comparing the relative valuation of value and growth stocks over the last two decades reveals that value is now 30% cheaper than it was, while growth is 56% more expensive."



In equities, the long-standing debate between value and growth investing hinges on two key factors: a stock's current valuation and its future economic performance. Historically, value investing has proven highly effective over the long term, outperforming growth by 5.5 times since 1963 in the US market and having similar significant margins in Europe.

However, over shorter time frames, growth can emerge as the winner, often coinciding with the build-up of market bubbles. Interestingly, the current landscape reveals that growth stocks in Europe have never been this expensive compared to their value counterparts, even during the dot-com bubble.





Source: HSBC AM, Eurostat, Refinitiv, September 2023.

Today, it seems that investors might be overestimating the future growth of growth stocks while underestimating that of value stocks. The recent underperformance of value stocks can be attributed to a variety of factors, but largely appears to be an unprecedented valuation anomaly. This divergence in valuation is known as the 'valuation spread', which can expand due to cheaper stocks becoming even cheaper, expensive stocks becoming pricier, or a combination of both.

This spread had widened due to successive market crises in Europe, reaching new highs during the pandemic.

Various theories have attempted to explain this anomaly. Indeed, the sequence of crises in Europe and the herd behaviour around mega-cap growth stocks has played a significant role. From a more fundamental perspective, earnings, valuation and interest rates are the factors to look at.



The impact of earnings and valuations

Over the last two decades, the relative change in earnings almost always contributes negatively to value stocks' performance. This doesn't come as a surprise since value stocks tend to have less healthy fundamentals and tend to underperform economically. On the other hand, changes in valuation are almost always positive – since value stocks tend to overreact with regards to poor fundamentals, creating a valuation anomaly and a subsequent rerating.

The first chart below shows the significant correlation between relative earnings and the ISM index. This suggests that value earnings are more cyclical than earnings in general. For example, a strong negative earnings effect always coincides with recessions.

Figure 2: Relative change in earnings for value (red, lhs) vs. ISM index (black, rhs)




Past performance is no guarantee of future returns.

Periods of strong economic growth (2004-2007, 2011-2015, 2021-2022) were periods where the earnings effect is less negative. Currently, the earnings effect is holding surprisingly well given the level of the ISM index. Much of this comes from strong earnings momentum in the banking sector, which is growing its earnings by 30% on a year-on-year basis. Yet the market is expecting bank earnings to fall by 30% in the next 12 months (assuming valuations are a good indication of future growth).

Regarding the valuation effect, the second chart below shows the strong correlation with the value spread, measured by the difference in earnings yield between the value portfolio and the whole universe. In fact, the value spread tends to lead the valuation effect by around three months.

Figure 3: Relative change in valuation for value (red, lhs) vs. value spread (black, rhs)



Past performance is no guarantee of future returns.



In summary, the performance of value stocks over the past two decades seems guite straightforward. Value earnings tend to underperform and have a cyclical bias. Value benefits from a positive valuation effect which is determined by the value spread. The more value stock are attractive, the more the valuation effect will be strong.

This has worked quite well up until 2018. We notice a disconnect in 2018, where despite a large value spread, the valuation effect is on average flat and even negative. This in turn has increased the value spread even more as there is no mean reversion effect through arbitrage.

Although fundamentals have not deteriorated and earnings were at least average, it is exclusively valuation that has driven the underperformance. The fall of longterm interest rates to – and even below – zero has been seen by a significant amount of market observers as the main reason for this unusual phenomenon. But what does this theory rely on?



The interest rate factor

The argument supporting the theory that interest rates have been the main argument to explain the value/growth spread goes as follows. Within a discounted valuation model, growth stocks have a longer duration than their value peers as most of their value is embedded in the long term – future income streams, terminal value, etc. The sensitivity of growth stock valuations to interest rates is thus greater than for value stocks – where value is embedded in the short term.


Consequently, the theory is that relative performance of value stock tends to be correlated to interest rates. Value underperforms when interest rates fall and outperforms when interest rates rise.

Historically, the correlation between value and interest rates has never been significant and there are periods when correlation was even negative – interestingly during the inflationary environment of the 70s. Over the recent period, sensitivity of value to interest rates has increased dramatically and even reached almost 0.8 after falling back to 0.3. Overall, and despite the theory making sense intuitively, it is not empirically robust.

Looking forward

The past decades have been challenging for value investors. Although the underperformance can be explained over much of this period, our view is that an anomaly has appeared over the last 3-5 years, with investors capitulating on value.

Figure 4: Rolling 2-year correlation between US Value / Growth and US 10-year rates



Mar-64 Mar-68 Mar-72 Mar-76 Mar-80 Mar-84 Mar-88 Mar-92 Mar-96 Mar-00 Mar-04 Mar-08 Mar-12 Mar-16 Mar-20 Source: Kenneth French Data Library (mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html), Bloomberg, October 2023.

Past performance is no guarantee of future returns.

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"We see a series of coinciding signals suggesting that the current value/growth spread, particularly in Europe, is due for reversion over the coming years."



Moreover, investors seem to have capitulated on the concept of valuation, taking decisions solely based on profit growth.

As of now, and despite a recent small rebound, European value equity markets have a long way to go to fully recover. Although the gap with growth equities has somewhat retreated from recent peaks, it remains at record highs. We see this as an anomaly, especially since the earnings of value stocks have outpaced those of growth stocks over the last two years.

This leaves us in a situation where this valuation anomaly could continue to fade, revealing a significant outperformance potential for value stocks. Indeed, timing this recovery is almost impossible, but maintaining an underweight stance on value seems to be a risky strategy, in our view.



Intelligent diversification through thematics

"We think new sources of diversification will be needed as part of a new investment paradigm"



We expect a new paradigm that looks very different to the secular stagnation of the 2010s, with the introduction of higher interest rates, higher average inflation and looser fiscal policy. This poses challenges to both equity returns and the role of traditional diversifiers, with a negative stock/bond correlation no longer as reliable. Finding pockets of opportunity and diversification will be ever more important. Allocating to thematic investments may support this goal, if approached in a structured manner that reduces downside risks.


Importantly, thematic allocations are distinct from traditional equity allocations and cut across typical dimensions such as geographies, sectors and style factors. In this regard, we are not referring to classic, cyclical investment themes such as 'higher for longer' interest rates, which can be expressed within portfolios using traditional allocation levers. The differing drivers of returns from individual themes is what makes them a consideration for delivering returns and diversification in an uncertain environment ahead.

In our Mid-Year Outlook we discussed the Gartner Hype Cycle and its role in thematic equity returns – with the typical experience having been inflated expectations after an innovation trigger for a given theme, which subsequently leads to deflated prices and negative returns before the longer-term benefits to productivity and earnings are realised. To illustrate this point, we can look at the performance of renewable energy over the last few years. Being a necessity to longer-term economic and societal development globally, clean energy is clearly not a fad or short-term technology which will not endure over the longer term. Nonetheless, returns from the sector have followed this cycle.

Given the notorious volatility of thematic investments, we posit that diversification should be of primary importance in shaping a thematic allocation. Some investors have questioned whether effective diversification is in fact possible in thematics, suggesting that all themes share a narrow set of return drivers, and as such, meaningful diversification becomes impossible.

As illustrated in figure 2 on the following page, we have divided the thematic universe into three categories or 'transformational trends'. Within each category theme correlation is high, as expected, but between categories correlations are low – demonstrating a surprisingly heterogenous broad thematic universe.

Figure 1: Time series of excess returns versus global equities



Source: HSBC AM, Bloomberg data, October 2023.

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Figure 2: Correlation of excess returns (versus global equities) between select themes and Transformational Trends

	Green Transformation	Technology & Innovation	Evolving Society
Climate & Energy Transition	0.25	0.22	0.15
Circular Economy & Green Infrastructure	0.26	-0.17	0.13
Natural Resources & Water	0.34	-0.16	0.00
Automation & Robotics	-0.04	0.46	0.00
Disruptive Technologies	-0.11	0.57	0.29
Digitalisation	0.05	0.59	0.26
Future Consumer	-0.04	0.56	0.00
Diversity, Equity and Inclusion	0.22	-0.23	0.21
Healthcare Innovation	0.10	0.22	0.43

Source: HSBC AM, Bloomberg data, April 2013 to September 2023.

Shaping a thematic allocation

Historical correlations indicate that over the long term, an allocation across all three transformational trends will benefit from meaningful diversity and volatility reduction versus single theme investing.

Of course, given the disruptive nature of most transformational trends or their underlying themes, and the opportunity for the underlying companies driving them to challenge incumbents, thematic exposures create inherent style factor biases such as growth over value, and emphasis on smaller companies with less profitability. Nonetheless, our analysis shows alpha delivered in the past performance of themes that cannot be fully explained by inherent style factor, sector or country biases.

In figures 3 and 4 we show the factor biases for two very relevant but different themes in today's environment.

Inherent differences between the exposures captured within each theme reiterate the diversification benefit of a multitheme approach.

Today, the artificial intelligence theme has qualities that position it favourably in the short-term environment given exposure to positive momentum, along with size and growth, which continue to outperform. However, longer-term headwinds, such as higher rates that would remove the tailwinds growth benefited from under secular stagnation in the 2010s, leave question marks over the ability to extend outperformance further out.

To the contrary, agribusiness should be well placed under a new paradigm that benefits value and cyclicals over growth, particularly given its positive exposure to commodities, energy and other factors connected to the higher average inflation regime we expect to see in the years ahead.

The advantage of spreading a portfolio's allocation across the transformational trends is clear, leaving only the question of how to determine the most appropriate long-term split across themes, for those desiring exposure.

Figure 3: Artificial intelligence factor relatives (vs global equities)





Figure 4: Agribusiness factor relatives (vs global equities)



Source: HSBC AM, Bloomberg data, November 2023.

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Our analysis of returns over the last decade suggests that an equal weighting methodology across the underlying themes is the most appealing, generating the strongest excess returns and diversification benefits.

While our research provides useful historical context, we must be mindful not to build allocations based on historic performance data alone. An equally weighted allocation holds several additional advantages outside of the stronger returns it has delivered historically:

- Portfolio simplicity: equal weighting is an objective, rules-based, high diversification approach to long term allocations
- Theoretical robustness: over the long term, there is no theoretical justification for the persistent outperformance of one transformational trend versus another. As such, an agnostic view on trends is intuitively appealing

 Allocation neutrality: an equally weighted starting point provides a neutral platform from which active asset allocation can be conducted.

Evaluating the investment case

With bond yields sitting close to 25-year highs, fixed income investors are all but guaranteed a strong decade ahead. Yet, looking at current price-to-earnings ratios, the reverse might be true for equity markets. Moreover, a combination of secular headwinds approach, including the reversal or slowdown in globalisation, and climate change policies being potential contributors to continued inflation. Separately, demographic and other constraints are set to be a drag on growth. These issues also point to a likely lower profit share of GDP after peaking in recent years. In short, the golden age of equity market returns might be drawing to a close.




Figure 5: Equally weighted thematic portfolio factor biases versus global equities

Source: HSBC AM, Bloomberg data, April 2013 to September 2023. Past performance is no guarantee of future returns.


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In our latest
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HSBC Asset Management

Are thematics a solution? They offer promise given thematic allocations look to invest in, and profit from, the very disruptive forces that spell trouble for the equity market. From spending on climate change, to solutions for an aging population, the broad equity market's loss should be a thematic investment's gain.

However, as always, the investment case is not perfectly clear cut. Considering the factor and macroeconomic sensitivities of a thematic portfolio, we can see that it is highly sensitive to GDP growth, demonstrates limited profitability, and tends to be concentrated in smaller companies. These attributions will not be supportive during a higher interest rate, low-growth environment.

Thus, while there is potential for superior returns, as demonstrated by the performance of the artificial intelligence theme this year, a balanced scorecard approach to thematic investing is needed to build a holistic investment case. This includes establishing fundamental views along with systematic inputs and robust portfolio construction. Implemented in a thoughtful way, thematics can provide intelligent diversification both for the cyclical investment horizon and medium-term regime change underway.



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